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Abstract
Platforms today are experimenting with many novel
personalization technologies. We explore one such
technology here, voice-based conversational agents,
with a focus on consumer trust. We consider the
joint role of two key design / implementation choices,
namely i) disclosing an agent’s autonomous nature to
the user, and ii) aesthetic personalization, in the form
of user voice cloning. We report on a set of controlled
experiments based on the investment game, evaluating
how these design choices affect subjects’ willingness
to participate in the game against an autonomous,
AI-enabled partner. We find no evidence that disclosure
affects trust. However, we find that the greatest level
of trust is elicited when a voice-based agent employs a
clone of the subject’s voice. Mechanism explorations
based on audio analytics indicate that voice-cloning
induces trust by eliciting a perception of homophily.
1. Introduction
Voice-based autonomous agents, such as Google
Assistant, Siri, and Alexa, are playing an increasingly
prominent role in the digital economy. Some industry
estimates suggest that 38.5% of Americans interact
with voice-based assistants, and Gartner has projected
that the current market for Voiced-based Personal
Assistants will soon reach $3.5 Billion, comprised of
both consumer and employee support applications. As
this technology begins to permeate work and day-to-day
life, several digital providers and platform operators are
beginning to explore the design of voice-based agents,
to create engaging interfaces, and optimize the user
experience.
Voice-based AI is not only top of mind for platform
operators; governments and regulators have also turned
their attention to these new technologies. As a primary
example, the California State legislature recently
passed the Bolstering Online Transparency (B.O.T.)
Act (aka the ”blade-runner bill”) which requires that
firms disclose the autonomous nature of conversational
customer service agents at the outset of any customer
interaction. Fines for undisclosed agents can cost an
organization up to $2,500 per interaction in the state
of California. Additionally, it may only be a matter
of time before the U.S. federal government requires the
same amount of transparency as the Federal version, the
Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act of 2018, recently
landed on the Senate floor.1
Although the regulatory transparency requirements
help to protect consumers, disclosing an agent’s
autonomous nature may have severe consequences for
consumer perceptions and interactions. For instance, in
specific contexts like movie and book recommendations
[1], or medical diagnosis [2], individuals have been
shown to distrust algorithms. However, in other
contexts, such as forecasting, dating recommendations
[3], or investment advising [4], individuals have
often been found to prefer algorithms. Accordingly,
depending on the organizational context, there may be
benefits or detriments to disclosing the true nature of an
autonomous agent.
While literature on algorithmic aversion and
appreciation has considered a variety of contexts,
relatively little work has considered e-commerce
applications, despite that these are likely to be one of the
most common use-case for conversational autonomous
agents in the coming years. Exceptions include the
work by [5], who conducted a study of voice-based
chatbots working on behalf of a financial institution,
soliciting loan renewals from existing customers. Those
authors found that disclosure of a chatbot’s autonomous
nature could lead to significant reductions (7̃9.7%) in
conversion, depending on whether the disclosure was
made up-front or after some delay [5]. In a digital
retail context, [6] reported that disclosure of a text-based
chatbot’s autonomous nature drove significant increases
in perceived likeability. Given this contrast in prior
results, it remains relatively unclear by what mechanism
disclosure influences consumer perceptions, nor how
1https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3127





disclosure may affect consumer trust in a more general
sense. We therefore revisit this question, considering the
implications of disclosure for trust, a fundamental aspect
of economic exchange that is crucial to many consumer
contexts [7]. Disclosure is likely to influence trust
because the decision to disclose may foster transparency
on the part of a user. Further, failure to explicitly
disclose may have negative consequences if a user
independently perceives the autonomous nature of the
other party.
With the changing legal climate moving in the
direction of forced disclosure, organizations may require
ways to mitigate the negative appraisals of a fully
disclosed agent. One potentially fruitful avenue is
personalization. More specifically, a long stream of
work speaks to the relationship between homophily and
trust, including as it relates to voice-based similarity.
While voices have several features[8], research in
psychology has found that individuals are more attracted
to others when they share similar voice characteristics
[9]. Thus computer-generated voices are preferred
when their features imply personality traits that are
similar to the user [10]. These prior findings are
notable because recent technological innovations enable
the possibility of voice cloning, in near real-time, on
the basis of relatively small voice samples [11]. With
this new technology, there now exists the possibility
that organizations can dynamically personalize a
voice-based autonomous agent to a particular user .
Furthermore, it is essential to consider how
disclosure may interact with dynamic personalization.
More simply, in the presence of disclosure, we
might anticipate that personalization will be perceived
positively. For instance, agents that use disclosure
may be approached with less scrutiny or cynicism by
the user; conversely, absent disclosure, personalization
attempts may trigger an adverse reaction if perceived
as duplicitous or manipulative. Thus, we explore the
following formal research questions in this work: To
what extent does voice cloning induce trust in an
autonomous (spoken) agent? Does disclosure of a
spoken agent’s autonomous nature causally impact
user trust? How does disclosure affect the response
to voice-based personalization?
To address these questions, we build on a version
of the behavioral economics ”trust game” implemented
by [12, 13], whose studies examined the role of
communication on trust. In our adaptation, two players,
a human subject and an AI agent, play a one-shot
game with each other. After pairing with the agent,
the human subject faces a choice of whether to trust
the other party. Suppose the human player decides to
trust the agent. In that case, the player faces the risk
that the automated player is designed to act selfishly,
maximizing its payoff. Under this setup, two aspects
of the interaction are experimentally manipulated. First,
we randomly assign some subjects to AI disclosure; that
is, for a random set of subjects, at the outset of the
pairing, the AI agent’s autonomous nature is explicitly
disclosed. Second, we randomize human subjects to
receive alternative forms of communication from the AI
agent (or no communication, in the Control condition).
Thus, before the human subject makes a decision about
whether to play, i.e., opting-in, in some conditions the
automated agent issues a message to the subject. This
message is communicated either textually or verbally.
In verbal conditions, the voice conveying the message
is either a dynamic clone of the subject’s voice or it is
a default male voice. These two manipulations allow
us to understand how the agent’s voice influences the
subject’s behavior, and how that influence varies with
explicit AI disclosure.
This game set up is relevant for consumer facing
AI for two reasons. First, in implementations of AI
in human facing job roles, agents act as a subordinate
[14], working on an organizations behalf, assisting
the consumer. For instance, a customer may call-in
to a company’s customer service-line and require the
automated agent to perform some task (e.g. change a
flight booking, update dinner plans, or perform a bank
transfer). In a scenario such as this, there is a degree of
uncertainty as to whether the agent will indeed perform
as expected. Our game is an appropriate representation
for this real world context, as [12, 13] designed to study
scenarios with hidden-information, where true actions to
be taken by an agent are unknown. Secondly, the game
scenario used in this setting focuses on an economic
based version of trust. While there are several versions
of trust used in designing technology artifacts like [15],
our version of trust in this game provides a more realistic
view of how individuals will make real-time decisions.
Much aligned with [16], the use of this behavioral game,
will most accurately mirror human decision making as
opposed to using imagined vignettes.
As we will demonstrate, subjects are most apt to
participate, and thus trust, when they engage with
a voice-based agent that is explicitly disclosed, and
which bears a voice signature that is a clone of the
subject’s own voice. Interestingly, mere disclosure is
not sufficient to significantly impact subject trust. We
speculate here that the relative lack of trust exhibited in
other conditions, even with disclosure, may be driven by
subjects’ discerning or suspecting that their counterpart
is indeed automated, regardless of explicit disclosure.
When the agent is not disclosed, the subject may
interpret this as an attempt at deception that harms the
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appraisals of trustworthiness [17].
Our findings are important as they contribute to both
research and practice. From a theoretical standpoint,
this work contributes to the burgeoning work assessing
human acceptance of algorithms [5, 18, 19, 20] by
critically examining how and why individuals trust
algorithms in an economic scenario, and how the
aesthetic aspects of these systems can influence behavior
and perception. Second, we contribute to the literature
on personalization in information systems [21] and
marketing [22, 23]. We seek to evaluate whether and to
what extent a new personalization technique, dynamic
voice cloning, can influence consumer perceptions
and engender trust. Finally, our research aims to
inform practice, as we investigate how AI disclosure,
a regulatory requirement on the horizon, influences
human interaction with audio-based conversational
agents. Further, we describe an A/B testing framework
for evaluating the design and implementation of
voice-based AI systems.
2. Literature Review
2.1. Algorithms in Human Facing Job Roles
The use of algorithms to support decision-making is
a lengthy line of inquiry [24, 25, 26]. As algorithms
have become the bedrock of our society, it is no surprise
that human interaction with algorithms is an emerging
topic in Marketing [4, 5], Psychology [27, 3], Computer
Science [28], and Economics [29].
One specific stream of research, of relevance
here, focuses on human appreciation and aversion to
algorithmic judgment. While this stream of work is
developing, much of the findings categorize human
perceptions of algorithms as highly contextual. In some
cases, individuals appreciate algorithms, specifically
when dealing with concrete, objective outcomes like
numeric forecasts [3], providing geographic directions,
or predicting the weather [4]. In other cases individuals
tend to prefer human judgment, particularly for more
subjective tasks, like music recommendation [28], HR
decisions [4, 20], and medical diagnoses [2]. As
human-facing job roles comprise a mix of objective
and subjective tasks, it is possible that individuals may
have positive or negative reactions to algorithms in these
contexts.
Aligned with the notion that humans react negatively
toward AI in these roles, [5] find that customers dislike
interacting with AI agents in a sales role. More
specifically, they executed a field experiment with a
financial loan company in China. A voice-based AI
agent placed a sales call and asked customers whether
they would like to sign up for a loan renewal [5].
In outbound calls, the authors randomly manipulate
whether to disclose that the agent is autonomous [5].
This simple act of disclosure reduced loan renewal
by 79.7% [5]. These authors’ findings reinforce
that there could be drastic real-world consequences to
organizations if disclosure is a regulatory requirement.
In contrast, other authors have found that humans
can be receptive to AI in these roles. In a lab
experiment, [6] manipulated disclosure of a highly
anthropomorphized text-based AI Agent in a customer
service setting. There we find that disclosure of an
AI agent’s autonomous nature significantly improves its
likeability. Additionally, [18], evaluate how workers in
a sales setting react to human versus AI sales coaches.
In a series of field experiments, sales agents work
with potential customers to sell loans and are randomly
assigned to receive a human versus AI sales coach [18].
Notably, those authors observed sales improvement for
the average salesperson receiving the AI coach instead
of the human [18].
As the emerging literature in human interactions
with algorithms in human-facing job roles is fractured
and likely dependent on a myriad of contextual factors,
a more general consideration is needed to enable our
understanding of how and when human’s may trust
algorithms in an e-commerce setting. Experimental
economics is replete with designs that have been
developed to assess fundamental human behavior in
response to basic stimuli, to identify and examine
human decision-making biases and strategic behavior
(e.g. trust, cooperation, negotiation). We thus draw on
this literature, in an effort to further our understanding of
how humans trust and react to algorithms [30, 31, 32].
While the prior literature in behavioral economics has
not focused on studying human-machine interactions,
the field has inadvertently studied this phenomenon on
many occasions, through the use of computer players
in experimental games [31, 33, 34]. Notably, this is
also true of some work in Human Computer Interaction
(HCI) (e.g., [35, 36, 37]) and Organizational Behavior
[19].
When individuals interact with computer players in
economic experiments, a common finding has been that
subjects tend to behave more rationally and act more
for their personal gain [19, 31, 34]. More specifically,
individuals negotiate less emotionally with computer
players [19, 38, 34], they more readily cooperate [39],
they bid more conservatively in auctions [40], and they
are more likely to exploit learned behavior in repeated
play [41]. The reasoning for the altered behavior relative
to experiments involving human partners is that there is
a reduced role for social considerations when subjects
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interact with computer players [31].
While most of these interactions exist through
a simple computer interface, in the rare instance
where subjects have faced a computer player that
possesses human-like qualities, subjects’ behavior has
been notably less predictable. For instance, in a
prisoner’s dilemma game, human subjects are more
likely to reject cooperation with a computer player
imbued with a human-like voice compared, compared
to a text-based computer or human [35]. Additionally,
individuals tend to reason through offers similarly when
given by a human-like robot or by a true human [36].
These findings are particularly applicable to settings
wherein AI-enabled agents operate in human-facing job
roles, as their implementation likely utilizes some form
of human-like qualities, like voice interaction [5] or
communicative dialog and social cues. As humans tend
to anthropomorphize AI agents [42], one way to design
persuasive interfaces is to look to the social variables
identified in human-to-human interactions [37].
2.2. Similarity Attraction
Similarity attraction is a phenomenon that has been
studied by social psychologists for decades [43]. This
type of attraction occurs when individuals appraise
others as being similar to themselves in some personal
dimension like facial attributes [44], demographics [45,
46], and attitudes [47, 48]. Although initially observed
in face-to-face interpersonal contexts, similarity-based
attraction transfers to several online contexts: social
media [49, 50], computer-mediated communication
[51], and voice-based exchanges [9] to name a few.
HCI designers have also noticed human affinity
towards AI agents that are similar in some respects to
the focal user. More specifically, individuals trust AI
agents that possess similar paralinguistic vocal cues that
align to their personality [10] and display accents that
are congruent with their own [9]. In a recent experiment
investigating human AI teamwork, [52] found that
people prefer to work with AI agents whose avatar
image displayed similar racial and gender characteristics
and ultimately trusted these agents more than those that
were dissimilar. As they relate to AI Agent design, these
findings show that individuals tend to trust systems that
display similar aesthetics to themselves.
Although there are many reasons for similarity
attraction, a dominant explanation for the phenomenon
is the reinforcement-affect model [53]. This model
postulates that people enjoy experiencing positive
stimuli [53] and actively seek them. Since interactions
with similar individuals tend to go more smoothly,
as opposed to dissimilar stimuli, individuals are
drawn toward stimuli congruent with these attributions
[54]. For example, when individuals hear a similar
voice, they associate the sound with subsequent
positive conversations, as there is already a basis for
common ground. That said, it is somewhat unclear
how disclosure of an AI agent will interact with
similarity-based aesthetics. On the one hand, disclosure
alone may be enough to push individuals away from the
AI agent as it highlights dissimilarity. However, on the
other, it may mitigate the initial negative dissimilarity
appraisals.
As there are reasons to believe that AI agent
disclosure will influence trust, and similar voice
aesthetics may mitigate negative aspects invoked
by disclosure, we look to a behavioral economics
experiment to help us evaluate these features.
3. Methods
3.1. Experiment Design
We explore the influence of disclosure and
voice-similarity on trust by utilizing an experiment
design first introduced by [12], which was specifically
developed to understand how communication, generally,
influences trust. In the original game design, articulated
in Figure 1, subjects are first ”matched” to a human
playing partner and randomly assigned to play the
role of agent A or B. In the original treatment
condition, subjects playing the role of B would have
the opportunity to pass a written message to party A,
stating whatever they like, e.g., superfluous comments,
promises, etc. Subsequently, party A would decide
whether they wished to play the game with B (choosing
”in” or ”out”). If party A decided to play, B could
choose to walk away with some money, leaving A with
nothing, or B could choose to roll a die. Choosing to
roll, the final payoff to both parties would depend on the
resulting number that was rolled, with a 5 in 6 chance
of a positive payoff for both players. This study design
enabled [12] to examine how communication would
influence the decisions of both A (whether to trust B),
and B (how to behave upon receiving that trust).
We modified this game, in three key ways. First,
we re-implemented the game in a digital setting,
incorporating voice-based messaging in addition to the
original text-based communication that was considered
in the original study. Second, we assign party B
to always be played by an autonomous agent. We
thus have two experimental conditions that generally
mirror those of the original study design: a control
condition, where no communication would take place,
and a written (text-based) message condition, wherein
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Figure 1. Payoffs Adapted from Charness &
Dufwenberg 2006
party A would receive a written text-based message
from party B. In the latter case, for the sake of realism,
we simply reused messages at random that were drawn
from those exchanged by subjects in the original studies
as documented by [12, 13]. These messages were
mostly promises of rolling the dice if the subject chose
in. Finally, we also fixed the agent’s choice where if the
subject opts in, the agent always chooses to roll. There
is no breaking of promises in our version.
We then supplement the above conditions with
others of our own devising. We added conditions
wherein the communication would take place via a
voice-based message, i.e., a recording. Further, we
manipulated the voice used in generating that recording,
employing a ’default’ computer voice in one condition
and a dynamic voice-clone in another condition (we
generate this clone based on a consent statement
recorded via telephone prior to the game beginning
- we provide more details on our procedure below).
Finally, we incorporate a set of additional conditions that
mirror the voice-based conditions above, as well as the
control condition, with the simple added element that
we disclose the autonomous nature of Party B to the
subject. This leaves us with 7 experimental conditions:
Control, Text, Control + Disclosure, Default Voice,
Default Voice + Disclosure, Clone Voice, and Clone
Voice + Disclosure.
A detailed outline of how subjects play our game
can be found in Figure 2, which depicts the three-step
process. First, a subject would call into a 1-800 number
and reads a consent statement over the phone. Next,
a server records the consent statement, randomizes the
subject into one of the experimental conditions, and
returns a unique completion code. Third, the subject
then enters the completion code and plays the trust game
through their computer, via a web interface.
Figure 2. Study Enrollment Process
3.2. Voice Cloning
To implement voice cloning, we utilized an
open-source implementation of [11]. This voice
cloning method uses transfer learning, a Deep Learning
technique, which allows for learning in one task to
transfer over to another [55]. The voice cloning
model is comprised of three parts: a Speaker Encoder,
Synthesizer, and Vocoder. The Speaker Encoder takes a
short audio file and generates a speaker embedding. The
embedding is used with the Synthesizer, which maps
the to-be-generated spoken words to a mel-spectrogram.
This spectrogram is fed into the Vocoder, which takes
the spectrogram image and generates an audio file. An
illustration of [11], 2018’s three-part model can be found
in Figure 3 .
Figure 3. Jia et al 2018 Voice Cloning Model
The voice cloning software was installed on an
Amazon Web Services GPU instance. When a subject,
randomized into a voice clone condition, reads their
consent statement, this pipeline is triggered. The
resulting audio is loaded onto an S3 bucket, which
would then be presented as a message communicated
by Player B during game play. Party A would receive
this message just prior to making their decision about
whether to opt-in, to play with Party B. Similarly,
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disclosure would always take place prior the opt-in
decision.
4. Empirical Approach & Data
Our outcome variable of interest is whether the
subject chooses to be ”in,” trusting player B sufficiently
to play the game. Opt-in is thus reflected by a binary
indicator variable. Additionally, we utilize a series
of treatment dummies to capture each experimental
condition. For the analysis, we examine group-specific
opt-in rates, and we execute logistic regression and
Fishe Exact tests to identify how these treatments
associate with opt-in.
4.1. Subject Recruitment
Before conducting the experiment, a power analysis
was conducted, assuming effects consistent with those
observed by [12], in terms of sign and magnitude.
We recruited 1,118 subjects through Prolific. We
purposefully over-allocated subjects to the control
conditions (i.e., Control and Control + Disclosure)
to reduce load on our voice-generating servers, as
generating too many audio messages in a short period
would cause messages to be generated too slowly for
the experiment to progress correctly. Additionally,
we limited the subject pool to individuals from
the United States and Canada, as the original AI
models used in producing the recorded messages were
generated based on audio from North American English
speakers. Limiting the subject pool in this way
prevented additional accent based similarity or location
attributions [9].
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
Overall, shown in Table 1, participants trusted player
B on average 75.4% of the time. They also spent 322
seconds (about 5 minutes) playing the game, on average.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
In-Rate 0.754 0.431 0.00 1.00
Total Time (sec.) 322 194 48 263
Disclosure 0.410 0.492 0.00 1.00
Message .493 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age 33.4 11.8 18 78
We report the number of subjects per condition in
Table 2. As noted above, more subjects were allocated
into the control conditions to reduce load on our servers
handling voice-synthesis.
Table 2. Subjects per Condition
Condition Obs.
Control (No Message) – CD 2006 331
Text – CD 2006 109
Control + Disclosure 236
Default Voice 108
Default Voice + Disclosure 107
Cloned Voice 112
Cloned Voice + Disclosure 115
5. Results
5.1. Voice Cloning and Disclosure’s
Independent Influence on Opt-In
Overall results of our experiment by message type is
shown in Table 3. Model free evidence would suggest
that opt-in rate for voice-cloning is higher than both
the Default Voice and No Message conditions. As
compared to the text-based Charness and Dufwenberg
2006 conditions, Cloning appears to perform at least
as good as the undisclosed text-based condition. To
determine the influence of voice cloning on opt-in rate,
we estimate a logit model with the binary outcome
variable Opt In, and the condition Clone as the reference
condition. As shown in Table 3, we find that Cloning
an end users voice does indeed encourage higher opt-in
from the subject as compared to No Message and the
Default voice message.
OptIni = α+ β1 · 1MessageTypei + εi (1)
Table 3. Message Type (Logit)






Note: ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.10.
Somewhat surprising, when comparing Opt-In for
Undisclosed and Disclosed partners, rates appear
identical at (75%). In conducting pairwise χ2 tests we
find no statistically significant difference between the
two conditions (p>.1). Thus we can conclude that,
at least in our context, individuals do not have a bias
towards interacting with humans over AI agents.
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5.2. Voice Cloning and Disclosure
We next report a series of pairwise Fisher-Exact
tests demonstrating the relative performance of all seven
conditions. Figure 4 depicts the opt-in rate for each
condition. Here we can see that the Clone + Disclosure
condition achieves the highest opt-in rate (89.5%), and
thus appears to garner the greatest level of trust. To
Figure 4. In Rate by Condition - (95% Confidence
Intervals)
assess this result, we conduct pairwise comparisons of
each of these conditions through use of the Fisher Exact
test. Interestingly, the Clone + Disclosure condition
has a significantly higher Opt-In rate as compared to
Disclosed or Undisclosed No Message and Default
Message conditions, this is significant at the (p<.01)
and (p<.05) respectively 2. Additionally, there is no
significant difference between and among both Clone
conditions and the undisclosed text condition. This
lends support for use of voice cloning as it compares
to a default voice, however the clone performs no better
than the text based condition.
5.3. Randomization Checks
In our experimental setup, we randomized
individuals when they entered the experiment. To
ensure that the randomization process occurred
successfully, we assess balance across conditions in
terms of several observable characteristics of subjects
including age, latitude, longitude and gender and
educational attainment. As shown in Table 4 and
Table 5, we observe no significant imbalance on any
of these variables. Although these linear regressions
effectively report pairwise comparisons with the control
condition (taken as reference), the results remain
2These p values do not utilize an adjustment for false discovery,
when this is incorporated the p-values are slightly higher with (p<.05)
and (p<.1)
similarly null when we employ alternative conditions as
reference.
Table 4. Randomization Balance Checks
(OLS Regression)
Female Lat Lon Age
Control-D 0.03 −0.63 1.27 0.34
(0.04) (0.45) (1.40) (0.99)
Default −0.07 0.67 −0.73 −1.47
(0.05) (0.58) (1.82) (1.28)
Default-D 0.04 0.12 0.40 0.05
(0.05) (0.59) (1.85) (1.30)
Text 0.02 0.19 1.70 0.65
(0.05) (0.59) (1.83) (1.29)
Clone 0.00 0.27 1.49 −1.11
(0.05) (0.58) (1.81) (1.27)
Clone-D 0.04 0.46 1.85 −0.61
(0.05) (0.57) (1.77) (1.25)
(Intercept) 0.44∗∗∗ 37.65∗∗∗ −92.64∗∗∗ 33.75∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.29) (0.91) (0.64)
R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Adj. R2 −0.00 0.00 −0.00 −0.00
∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
Table 5. Randomization Check (MLOGIT;
DV=Message Type)
Variable No Message Default Text
Bachelor’s -0.059 -0.354 -0.045
(0.059) (0.271) (0.315)
High school 0.435 -0.137 -0.900
(0.340) (0.415) (0.617)
Less than high school -0.064 -0.481 0.141
-(0.734) (0.940) (0.951)
Some college 0.306 0.091 -0.465
(0.243) (0.280) (0.359)
Constant -0.039 *** 1.27e-08 -0.019 *




∗∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗p < 0.1
6. Mechanism Exploration
Next, to better understand the mechanisms that
underlie our results in the main experiment, we ran
a follow-on experiment, employing a similar design.
However, instead of testing disclosure, we seek to
understand which features of an AI agent’s voice may
be driving the increased trust by the subject. In this
experiment we have three conditions: 1) Cloning with
Disclosure, 2) Default Male Voice with Disclosure 3)
Random Voice with Disclosure. The Random Voice
with disclosure is a random draw of speaker embeddings
from the Librispeech dataset. 3
To analyze how individual features influence trust,
we execute a causal mediation analysis [56]. For the
3https://www.openslr.org/12
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Table 6. Subjects per Condition
Condition Obs.
Clone + Disclosure 221
Default Voice + Disclosure 219
Random Voice + Disclosure 226
analysis of vocal features, we utilize PRAAT 4, an open
source computer tool commonly used in phonology. We
generate features associated with both the phone-read
consent statement and the AI generated audio messages.
We construct a normalized score of four different
features that are typically used to characterize voice
signatures in spoken language, namely fundamental
frequency (f0), harmonic to noise ratio (hnr), vocal jitter,
and vocal shimmer. Based on the normalized difference
among these four features, between the generated audio
and the human subject’s recorded audio, we create an
index / score reflecting the voice-similarity between
each subject and their voice-based, AI-enabled partner.
Figure 5 illustrates the mediated relationship of vocal
differences on trust.
Figure 5. Vocal Differences Indirect Influence on
Trust
As shown, there is a negative relationship between
clone and vocal differences. This makes sense as
cloning is meant to reduce the distance between the
speaker and the generated voice. Secondly, we see that
the vocal difference is also negatively associated with
trust. This would suggest that the closer the match to
the focal speakers voice, the more likely the subject
will choose in. This strengthens the argument for voice
clones, or similar sounding voices being used to help
influence trust.
7. Discussion
Our work provides a novel first look at a potentially
impactful design aesthetic of spoken AI agents, dynamic
voice cloning. Our behavioral economics experiment
4https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/praat/
shows that incorporating voice cloning may be a viable
option to elicit trust from individuals interacting with AI
agents in collaborative and economic interactions.
Secondly, this work evaluates how AI Agent
disclosure influences trust in these artifacts. While
previous fieldwork suggests that individuals react
adversely when agents disclose that they are automated
[5], from our study, we find that disclosure by itself
does not necessarily negatively impact trust. That said,
some of the discrepancies between [5], could be that
the ”realism” of voices utilized in our experiment is
lower than theirs. We used recordings from lower
quality telephone calls, thus making the generated
output somewhat rough and less lifelike. In turn, users
may readily identify that the agent is not a human and
breaking any initial trust perceptions a subject may have.
Regardless of the voice, mending this broken trust may
prove difficult [17]. It may also be a cautionary tale
for organizations that look to pursue a non-disclosure
strategy, as it may destroy consumer trust at the onset.
Perhaps a more realistic comparison to a true human
actor, in our experiment, would be the text-based CD
condition, as text messaging has few social cues for
subjects to determine if the agent is indeed human [57,
58]. That said, our dynamic voice clone with disclosure
condition performs at least as well as the CD condition.
This result furthers the notion that a potentially more
viable strategy for organizations to pursue is voice-based
personalization with disclosure, as there is no benefit to
withholding this information.
Thirdly, we evaluated how disclosure interacts with
dynamic voice cloning. From our results, we see that
disclosure, when paired with voice cloning, achieves the
highest in rate to a statistically significant degree over
the default voice (with or without disclosure) and no
message conditions. These findings are interesting as
it shows a potential path forward for organizations if
faced with increased regulatory disclosure requirements.
Additionally, further data requirements and regulations,
outside of AI disclosure, like GDPR, could be on the
horizon , limiting what archival data organizations can
use to personalize their customers’ experience [59].
Dynamic voice cloning can be done on the fly with
a small clip of a customer’s voice without needing to
persist any user data.
While our research evaluates a potential new
way for organizations to personalize their audio-based
experiences, our work has several limitations. Firstly,
our experimental context occurs in a controlled online
lab experiment; it is unclear how much trust is involved
in outcome variables of interest for marketers and
organizations (e.g., sales conversions, lead generation).
Although we feel that the lab-based setting gives our
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research the ability to tease out the potential influence of
disclosure on trust, further work should be done in the
field evaluating the efficacy of dynamic voice cloning in
the field.
Another limitation of our work is its focus on North
American English-speakers. It is not clear if our results
necessarily generalize across cultures. For example [5]
which takes place in a field setting in China, found
starkly different results as they relate to disclosure.
Further work on AI Agent disclosure could seek to
evaluate if there are perhaps country-based differences
in the reaction to this feature.
8. Conclusion
In conclusion, this work seeks to help AI
practitioners evaluate two crucial features, AI
disclosure, and voice-based aesthetic. While one
feature, AI Disclosure, may be a regulatory requirement
for all AI Agents in the future, we find that dynamic
voice cloning may help to elicit higher levels of trust
in disclosed voice-based systems. As voice-based AI
is becoming an ever more critical consumer channel,
dynamic voice cloning could be a potentially fruitful
step forward in designing transparent voice-based
consumer experiences.
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